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Collective Bargaining Agreements and State
Antitrust Immunity
Judicial deference to the administrative expertise of the NLRB
has recently been waning. Either by statute or by Supreme Court
pronouncement, federal and state courts have acquired greater juris-
dictional reach over issues previously thought "arguably subject" to
the provisions of the N.L.R.A. and therefore subject to the primary
jurisdiction of the NLRB. With the continued use of such phrases
as "peripheral concern of the Labor-Management Relations Act," or
"interests so deeply rooted in local feeling"' the Court appears to be
returning to the era when courts, and not the Board, were the main
arbiters of the boundaries of national labor policy. Recent cases deal-
ing with issues beyond the traditional labor dispute have held that
the jurisdiction retained by state courts included such issues as the
union's duty of fair representation to its members,2 malicious libel
in an election campaign, 3 and disqualification of felons from holding
union office.4
The apparent spirit of these cases has been applied in New York
to attack the heart of the collective bargaining process, the contract
itself, without initial reference to the Board. New York v. i'filk Han-
dlers and Processors Associations involved an alleged fixing and main-
tenance of noncompetitive prices in violation of the Donnelly Act,0
New York's antitrust law. Union drivers received salary plus com-
mission, with the commission determined by the wholesale price paid
by the retailer. The "impartial chairman" under the industry-wide
agreement allegedly established fixed-price markups to protect the
commission. The defendants argued that the state was preempted
from applying its laws to "activities . . . intertwined with collective
bargaining agreements,"7 daiming that the agreement concerned
1. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959).
2. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) ("Mhe decision to preempt federal and state court
jurisdiction over a given class of cases must depend upon the nature of the particular
interests being asserted and the effect upon the administration of national labor policies
of concurrent judicial and administrative remedies." Id. at 180).
3. Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 US. 53 (1966).
4. De Veau v. Braisted, 563 U.S. 144 (1960).
5. 52 Misc. 2d 658, 276 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
6. N.Y. G_.. Bus. IAW J§ 340-41 (McKinney 1957).
7. 52 Misc. 2d at 661, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 807-08. The union was not joined as a party
in the antitrust litigation, but it did file an amicus brief on the side of the milk com-
panies appealing this decision. Subsequently, union officials were indicted on criminal
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wages, a subject about which the parties were statutorily required to
bargain. The resolution of the prices-wages issue would determine
the applicability of state law, since while no one would deny that
state law would be preempted from penalizing the parties for agree-
ing on wage provisions," state law could penalize the parties for price-
fixing neither protected nor prohibited by the Act. The court rejected
the defendant's argument that it could not act until the NLRB deter-
mined whether the agreement fixed prices or wages:
There is no dispute between defendants and the union. They
have agreed. The subject matter of the dispute between plaintiff
and defendants is not a charge of unfair labor practice or refusal
to bargain collectively; it is not wages or working conditions.
Hence, the subject matter alleged in the complaint is not cogniz-
able by the National Labor Relations Board.9
The court apparently assumed that because the Board lacked juris-
diction over the particular dispute, the state law was not preempted.
This Note examines that assumption: In the context of state antitrust
enforcement, does the mere absence of NLRB jurisdiction over specific
issues--or specific issues presented in particular disputes-enable the
state court to assert jurisdiction over a dispute involving conduct
arguably protectedby the N.L.R.A.? When the NLRB has explicit
statutory jurisdiction to rule upon the existence of a possible unfair
labor practice or of possible protection by the Act, state courts must
defer to the NLRB.10 The negative implication of this rule may be,
however, that when the NLRB lacks jurisdiction, preemption dis-
appears as a doctrine compelling initial abstinence by state (or federal)
conspiracy charges arising from the same basic situation, which included other allegatlons
not relevant here.
8. Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
9. 52 Misc. 2d at 662, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 808-09 (footnotes omitted).
10. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Recent applications
of this general principle of judicial deference to administrative resolution of the factual
controversy on which coverage by the Act will turn include IBEW Local 1264 v. Broadcast
Serv., 380 U.S. 255 (1965) (per curiam) (integrated enterprise with sufficient earnings to
meet Board's jurisdictional prerequisites); Hattiesburg Bldg. & Trades Council v. Broome,
377 U.S. 126 (1964) (per curiam) (Board's jurisdictional standards as to commerce can be
satisfied by prnmary or secondary employer); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., S7 U.S. 301 (1964) (pick-
eting arguable labor dispute within exclusive jurisdiction of the Board); Journeymen V
Apprentices Local 100 v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963) (union interference with right of
individual to pursue occupation); Construction & Gen. Laborers' Local 488 v. Curry, 371
U.S. 542 (1963) (picketing); Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S.
173 (1962) (status as a labor organization). Pre-Garmon preemption cases in which the
primary jurisdiction rationale controlled include Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 1153
U.S. 1 (1957) (preemption even though Board declined to exercise its jurisdiction); Weber
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955) (jurisdictional dispute); Garner v. Teamsters
Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) (peaceful picketing). Eixceptions to this otherwise absolute
rule are discussed notes 35-7 infra.
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courts.:" If so, control over state court interpretation of federal law
would survive only on Supreme Court review.
Although no direct precedents resolve this issue, radiations from
three major cases suggest a tendency to blur together pre-emption and
the existence of Board jurisdiction, making the former depend upon
the latter. Rejection of this view in favor of initial pre-emption regard-
less of Board jurisdiction may result in the creation of a no man's land
wherein neither federal administrative nor state judicial remedies are
available.1
In Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver13 the state court had to decide
whether certain conduct constituted wage-fixing protected under fed-
eral law or price-fixing prohibited by state law. Upon a re-examination
of the facts, the Supreme Court held that the contract fixed wages and
not prices; the Ohio antitrust laws were therefore pre-empted. 4 But
although Oliver denied the applicability of state law, the Supreme
Court implicitly approved the state's exercise of initial jurisdiction to
decide whether the challenged labor contract provision concerned
protected or unprotected activity.'3
Shortly after Oliver, the Court faced the problem of initial pre-
emption in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon0 and held
that when an activity is arguably subject to Section 7 or 8 of the Act,
state as well as federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence
of the Board in order to avert state interference with national policy.
In Garmon, since union picketing was being challenged by an em-
11. See Journeymen & Apprentices Local 100 v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 694 (1963), where
the Court, in applying Garmon, stated that "the first inquiry . . . must be whether the
conduct called into question may reasonably be asserted to be subject to Labor Board
cognizance"; but did not state what the second inquiry would be if the first were not met.
12. The original no man's land of Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
was shortlived since Congress soon provided a statutory solution. 29 U-S.C. § 164(c)(1)
(1964). The hypothetical no man's land under discussion would differ from that in Guss
since the Guss situation concerned cases where the Board had jurisdiction but declined to
assert it, whereas the hypothetical is concerned with an absence of Board jurdiction
under the statute itself.
13. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
14. "To allow the application of the Ohio antitrust law here would wholly defeat the
full realization of the congressional purpose. The application would frustrate the parties'
solution of a problem which Congress has required them to negotiate in good faith toward
solving, and in the solution of which it imposed no limitations relevant here." Id. at
295-96.
15. The Garmon "arguably subject" test, discussed p. 792 infra, was not unveiled
by the Court until three months after Oliver. It is not dear that had Garmon preceded
Oliver, the "arguably subject test" would have controlled and resulted in deference to
the primary jurisdiction of the Board to determine the factual prices-wages issue which
the Oliver court itself resolved, since there was no traditional labor dispute between the
parties with which to invoke the processes of the Board. For a more extensive discussion
of this point, see p. 792.
16. 359 US. 256 (1959).
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ployer, the Board clearly had jurisdiction to hear the employer's unfair
labor practice complaint and to decide whether the activity was pro-
tected, prohibited, or beyond the scope of the Act and therefore within
the jurisdictional competence of the state. The "arguably subject" te'-t
of Garmon might therefore be read to apply only to situations in which
the Board had jurisdiction over the dispute. If so, the doctrine of
initial pre-emption hinged upon the existence of Board jurisdiction and
Oliver might still be good coin; if the Board lacked jurisdiction, the
pre-emption doctrine permitted the state court initially to decide the
jurisdictional issue, subject to Supreme Court review.17
Finally, Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co.18 held that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not bar a federal court from de.
termining whether a marketing hours provision was a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining and therefore immune from the Sherman Act. The
Court pointed out that the Board was powerless to resolve a contro.
versy when the parties to a collective bargaining agreement were
assailed by a third party who alleged that their agreement illegally
restrained trade:
The Board does not classify bargaining subjects in the abstract but
only in connection with unfair labor practice charges of refusal to
bargain.... Agreement is of course not a refusal to bargain, and
in such cases the Board affords no mechanism for obtaining a
classification of the subject matter of the agreement.10
Jewel Tea thus ratified federal court jurisdiction to determine
whether a collective bargaining provision was protected by the Act
whenever the Board lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. Application
of its reasoning to a case arising under a state antitrust law might sug-
gest that since the NLRB cannot decide such disputes, a state court
need not find its jurisdiction pre-empted merely because the defendants'
conduct was "arguably protected" as, say, wage-fixing, but could
17. See discussion note 15 supra.
18. 381 US. 676 (1965). Although the union lost the primary jurisdiction battle It won
the antitrust exemption war: the marketing hours restriction was a mandatory subject of
bargaining and since no conspiracy was proven, it did not violate the antitrust laws.
19. Id. at 687. The Court also recognized the possibility that even if jurisdiction lay
with the Board its General Counsel might not issue a complaint, and/or that in this anti
trust context the Act's six-month statute of limitation will often have expired. Contra,
Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 US. 201 (1964): "For although the National Labor Relations
Board is not barred from granting appropriate remedies by the fact that the challenged
conduct has ceased .... or that the construction has been completed,... charges of un-
fair labor practices must be filed within six months of their occurrence, and an employer
armed with a state injunction would have no incentive to initiate Board proceedings."
Id. at 307 (footnotes omitted).
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properly decide the jurisdictional issue subject to Supreme Court
review.
Thus, the logic of the Milk Handlers case can be explained by a
synthesis of the results reached in Oliver, Garmon, and Jewel Tea:
the first implicitly rejected initial pre-emption, the second accepted it
but only in a context where Board jurisdiction was available, and the
third explicitly denied pre-emption in a dispute over which the Board
lacked jurisdiction.
It can be argued, however, that the two doctrines are independent-
that initial pre-emption does not depend on the availability of Board
jurisdiction. If this is so, then Garmon is not limited to the labor dis-
pute context of Board jurisdiction, but creates a doctrine of initial
pre-emption extending to conduct not involving "normal" labor dis-
putes which is nevertheless "arguably protected" by the Act.
This alternative theory of initial pre-emption is not inconsistent with
the reasoning of Oliver, Garmon, and Jewel Tea. Although Oliver
rejects initial pre-emption in favor of initial state jurisdiction and
Supreme Court review, Garmon announced a retreat from this role of
factfinder on review three months later without even mentioning
Oliver:
The approach ... in which the Court undertook for itself to
determine the status of the disputed activity, has not been fol-
lowed in later decisions, and is no longer of general application.'
Thus, while Garmon can be reconciled with Oliver on its facts, the
Court's treatment of the earlier decision signalled not a new applica-
tion of a settled or smoothly developing doctrine, but a sudden shift
in attitude. The Court's new tack, however, is easily explainable. Be-
fore Garmon state courts had continued to assert initial jurisdiction
by distinguishing, misconstruing or ignoring the Court's pronounce-
ments on preemption, and "reversal on appeal came long after the
20. 559 U.S. at 245 n4. The Court referred to UAWV Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949). as an example of its discarded approach. There
the union, without clarifying its demands, had engaged in numerous unannounced work
stoppages; the Court itself construed the N.L.RA. as neither protecting nor prohibiting
such action, thus leaving it within the jurisdictional reach of the states. Whether Gar-
mon's disapproval of this approach overruled by implication the comparable approach
taken in Oliver cannot be determined. Oliver did not involve the traditional labor dispute
in which the literal Garmon preemption rule (rejected by this Note, p. 794 infra), a
rule seemingly dependent upon the availability of Board jurisdiction, could be invoked,
whereas the Wisconsin case concerned a traditional union-employer dispute, albeit one
which involved new tactics by the union. The Garmon court was not unaw-are of Oliver,
and even cited it in another context (359 U.S. at 243 n.l), but seemingly chose not to
overrule it.
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generating labor dispute had run its course."" Placed in this context,
the Garmon "arguably protected" preemption doctrine must be viewed
as a new aggressive effort to immunize federal labor policy from such
state intervention.
Nor were the possible costs of the new policy lost upon the Court.
Garmon recognized that requiring the states to yield to the Board did
not ensure Board adjudication of the dispute involved, since the Board
might decline to assert its jurisdiction, the General Counsel might
refuse to file a charge, or the status of the activity might remain un-
defined in some other way.22 The Court foresaw and accepted the
consequence that initial preemption and Board inaction might create
a new "no man's land":
[T]he failure of the Board to define the legal significance under
the Act of a particular activity does not give the States the power
to act.... The governing consideration is that to allow the States
to control activities that are potentially subject to federal regula-
tion involves too great a danger of conflict with national labor
policy.23
Garmon thus appears to turn more on the dangers of state interference
and the need for preemption than on an availability-of-forum rationale.
If the latter were determinative, failure of the Board to act should
logically resurrect state jurisdiction; but as we have seen, the Court
clearly rejected this view.
Finally, Jewel Tea's rejection of Board primary jurisdiction in favor
of an initial judicial determination is not applicable pari passu when a
state court is to decide whether a union, singly or in collusion with
management, has violated a state rather than a federal antitrust law. Of
course the argument will inevitably be made that UMW v. Penning.
ton2-1 and Jewel Tea should operate to permit state as well as federal
21. C. Summers & H. Wellington, Labor Law, 11-223, Sept. 1966 (Preliminary & Ten-
tative Edition No. 3).
22. 359 U.s. at 245-46.
23. Id. at 246 (footnote omitted).
24. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). "This is not to say that an agreement resulting from union-
employer negotiations is automatically exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny simply because
the negotiations involve a compulsory subject of bargaining, regardless of the subject or
the form and content of the agreement .... [T]here are limits to what a union or an
employer may offer or extract in the name of wages, and because they must bargadn does
not mean that the agreement reached may disregard other laws . . [W]e think a
union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that it has
agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wagescale on other bargaining
units.. . .This is true even though the union's part is an undertaking to secure the
same wages, hours or other conditions of employment from the remaining employers
in the industry." Id. at 664-66. Thus a conspiracy of union and employer X to fix the
wages to be demanded from employer ', although involving a mandatory subject of
794
Vol. 77: 789, 1968
Collective Bargaining Agreements
courts to scrutinize labor-management agreements regardless of whether
they represent conduct either arguably or in fact protected or pro-
hibited by the N.L.R.A. If the entrusting of federal labor policy to the
Board does not supersede the federal antitrust statutes, it is no longer
dear that it supersedes state antitrust statutes. The cases display little
analytic differentiation between preemption and primary jurisdic-
tion.25 The exclusion of federal courts from labor law determinations
has usually been sufficient to exclude state courts as well. And it works
the other way: Garmon, although dealing with action by a state court, is
normally assumed to have operated to deny federal courts jurisdiction
(for federal causes of action as well as in diversity cases) whenever
conduct was arguably protected or prohibited.20
To meet the argument that Jewel Tea applies to state courts deciding
state causes of action, one might first point to the consequences of
allowing state courts to apply state antitrust laws to collective agree-
ments. The dividing line between permissive labor activity and pro-
hibited restraints on trade is at best unclear, and at worst more aptly
described as radically subjective. Union activity extending beyond the
limits of a single firm will be directly anticompetitive in its thrust, at
least when unions pursue traditional goals and seek to eliminate wage
differentials as an element of inter-firm competition. 7 A line between
collective bargaining about which the union is required to bargain and within the
arguable protection of Section 7, is nevertheless subject to the provisions and sanctions of
the Sherman Act.
25. Writers in the field have made the distinction. See, e.g., Ratner, New Developments
in Federal-State Jurisdiction, in N.Y.U. 15TH ANNuAL CONFERE ce Ox LAxOR 47, 55 (1962):
"[V]hat compels the state to yield is not the primary jurisdiction of the Board, but
Congress' determination to remove from state control certain areas in the field of labor
relations that are not necessarily co-extensive with the Board's jurisdiction to protect
or prohibit If state power depends on whether or not the disputed conduct falls within
or without that area, the scope of the Board's power may be quite irreleiant." See also
Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. COu. L. RL.
659, 699 (1965) (distinguishing Jewel Tea's acceptance of federal court jurisdiction from
issues involved in the previous state cases): "Those (pre-emption] cases are designed
primarily to bar the application of state substantive doctrines and state procedures and
scarcely control the issue of whether the jurisdiction of other federal tribunals charged
generally with the enforcement of the fundamental national policy embodied in the
Sherman Act should be obliterated."
26. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 242-43, reveals the Court's belief that the dangers of interference
with the objective of confiding administration of national labor policy to a central agency
are as great if different courts applying the same law are involved as when a state court
applying its own law is involved. See also Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485,
490-91 (1953): "A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt
to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive
law. The same reasoning which prohibits federal courts from intervening in such cases,
except by way of review or on application of the federal Board, precludes state courts
from doing so." (Quoted in part in Garrnon, 359 U.S. at 243).
27. See generally Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of
Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YA.E .-J. 14 (1963).
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the conflicting policies protecting unions acting in their own self-
interest and protecting the public from collusive anticompetitive
practices can perhaps be drawn by federal courts, which have experience
if no background of achievement in balancing the conflicting federal
laws. But 50 state courts seeking to harmonize 50 state antitrust laws
with the principles of federal labor policy will read into the N.L.R.A.
their individual prejudices and preconceptions concerning how much
protection federal law has actually given unions. The purpose of
preemption, as emphasized in Garmon, is to prevent such a result. And
to the extent that Garmon is the touchstone of state court jurisdiction
over labor disputes, the availability or non-availability of procedures
before the Board cannot be decisive if it is relevant at all.
Thus, by this analysis, the existence of Board jurisdiction is relevant
in federal litigation, where the concept of Board primary jurisdiction
recognizes "the need for orderly and sensible coordination of the work
of agencies and of courts."28 The presence or absence of Board jurisdic-
tion should not control the existence of state jurisdiction. Preemption
as an independent doctrine is
designed, not to prevent courts from adjudicating questions which
the Board can adjudicate, but to bar the application of substantive
state law upsetting the balance of power between labor and man-
agement expressed in the national labor policy.2D
Full protection of the balance of power from state intervention can be
maintained only if the Garmon "arguably subject" test is protected
from the wholesale erosion which would result from a return to an
availability-of-Board-adjudication rationale for the preemption doc-
trine.
A careful reading of Mr. Justice White's opinion in Jewel Tea
suggests that the Court may have left itself a line of retreat, albeit an
inelegant one, from the seemingly all-encompassing reach of Penning.
28. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISRATIVE LAw Tm, AsE § 19.01, at 5 (1958).
29. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 81-82, Meat Cutters Local 189 v. ewel
Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965). The briefs in Jewel Tea reveal that the union sought to
identify its argument for the dismissal of the case (becuase primary jurisdiction lay with
the Board) with a combination of Oliver and Garmon, the former of which, as we have
seen, not finding preemption until the Court itself had resolved the prices-wages con-
troversy, and the latter involving state jurisdiction over a traditional labor dispute. The
union assumed that had its case arisen under state antitrust law, Oliver and Garmon would
require its dismissal. Brief for Petitioner at 111, Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co.,
81 U.S. 676 (1965). The United States, as amicus, appeared to admit that a state prosecu-
tion would have to be dismissed but sought to distinguish it in the federal context; since
the Court adopted most of the arguments proferred by the Government it may have given
this assumption insufficient attention. See note 80 infra.
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ton and Jewel Tea. White's opinion is pivotal because he wrote for the
three Justices fence-sitting between Mr. Justice Douglas' enthusiastic
embrace of, and Mr. Justice Goldberg's vitriolic opposition to, an ex-
panded applicability of the antitrust laws to organized labor. In re-
jecting the argument that Board jurisdiction over the dispute barred a
federal court action, Justice White dropped a delphic footnote:
To be distinguished are the pre-emption cases in which the possi-
bility that the Board may not exercise jurisdiction renders state
courts no less powerless to act .... 0
Because the note cites Garmon, it might be read as applicable only to a
situation in which the Board has clear statutory jurisdiction but refuses
to exercise it. On the other hand, the note is available to the Court as
a basis for the possible future assertion that Pennington and Jewel Tea
did not license indiscriminate state prosecutions under state antitrust
law.
Furthermore, White's denial of primary jurisdiction was pegged to
federal court experience in classifying "terms and conditions of em-
ployment" (since these issues frequently arise in Norris-LaGuardia
injunction requests).31 In state antitrust cases there are no grounds for
assuming experience in interpreting the issues which arise under
N.L.R.A.
Second, White was able to argue that resolution of the manadatory-
nonmandatory controversy wvas irrelevant to the jurisdiction of the
federal court in Jewel Tea because the plaintiff's complaint alleged
a conspiracy between labor and management to force marketing hours
upon non-agreeing employers; under Pennington, an agreement grow-
ing out of such a conspiracy would violate the Sherman Act even
30. 381 U.S. at 688 n.4. The Court supported this proposition w.ith references to
Garmon and, more generally, Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 US. 252 (1964). ,.here it
had held that a federal court was preempted by the remedial provisions in the Labor-
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964), from applying
state common law to award damages resulting from peaceful union activity.
The Court's footnote in Jewel Tea may indicate a tacit acceptance of the unsupported
assumption of both the union and the Government that preemption would bar the bring.
ing of the suit at issue under a state antitrust law instead of the Sherman Act. However
this possibility was ignored by the state court in the Milli Handlers case.
81. "[qourts are ... not without experience is classifying bargaining subjects as terms
or conditions of employment. Just such a determination must be frequently made when
a court's jurisdiction to issue an injunction affecting a labor dispute is challenged under
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which defines 'labor dispute' as including 'any controversy
concerning terms and conditions of employment'.....381 US. at 686 (footnotes omitted).
Although White speaks in terms of "courts" and not specifically "federal courts," the
Norris-LaGuardia reference limits the recognition of experience to courts of the United
States.
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though its provisions involved a mandatory subject of bargaining. 2
Hence, to the extent that White relied upon the specific jurisdictional
allegations present in Jewel Tea, his opinion does not foreclose a dif-
ferent result in subsequent cases with different jurisdictional allega-
tions. Whenever a Pennington-type conspiracy is not alleged, as in the
Milk Handlers case,38 determination of the mandatory-nonmandatory
issue may still be decisive. Moreover, the concept of a "conspiracy" has
a wraithlike quality in Pennington. The determination of when unions
have acted in their own self-interest and when they have "conspired"
with management 4 may be no less crucial to the resolution of conflict-
ing federal policies toward antitrust enforcement and the protection
of "legitimate" union activity than the determination of precisely
which issues are mandatory subjects of bargaining. If this is true, the
same considerations which support the argument that state courts
should not be allowed to draw the line between mandatory and non-
mandatory subjects of bargaining suggest that neither should state
courts be allowed to assert jurisdiction on the basis of whatever they
conclude constitutes a Pennington-type conspiracy.
If we turn to prior cases involving the rights of states to enforce their
own laws in the area of labor-management relations, the availability of
a remedy before the Board is neither a necessary nor a sufficient test
for state court jurisdiction. The availability-of-remedy test does not
explain the decisions reached. But there is an alternative analysis
available which does harmonize the case law. The pattern which ap-
parently emerges from the decisions to date is that state courts retain
82. "Jewel's complaint alleged the existence of a conspiracy between Associated and the
unions [and, although involving terms and conditions of employment,] such an under.
standing is not exempt from the Sherman Act .... [Therefore] a Board determination
would have been of subsidiary importance at best." 881 U.S. at 686-87.
88. In Milk Handlers the complainant was not a third-party employer claiming injury
from the conspiracy of the union with other employers, but was the State, as the repre-
sentative of the public interest, which was suffering adverse effects from the alleged retail
price-fixing. However, even if a suit on all fours with Pennington were brought by a
complaining third party employer under state antitrust law, the Jewel Tea nondlispositive
issue rationale, which concerned only the scope of labor's exemption from the Sherman Act
and not issues of preemption of state antitrust law, might not lead to the same Tesult.
84. This self-interest versus conspiracy language has been determinative since the
decision in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 282 (1941), wherein Mdr. Justice
Frankfurter stated: 'So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with
non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 [of the Clayton Act] are not to be
distinguished by any judgment regarding the ... rightness or wrongness ... of the end
of which the particular union activities are the means." See also Allen Bradley Co. v,
IBEW Local 3, 825 U.S. 797 (1945).
Mr. Justice Douglas' concurrence in Pennington would, under certain conditions, view
the industry-wide collective bargaining agreement itself as prima facie evidence of an
antitrust violation. 381 U.S. at 673. If this view were to become widespread, indiscriminate
state attacks on the collective bargaining agreements in isolation from other indicia of
conspiracy would greatly interfere with national labor policy.
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jurisdiction over conduct "arguably subject" to the provisions of the
N.L.R.A. in three areas: (1) conduct involving violence and the threat
of harm (since the states were felt to have a "dominant interest" as the
"natural guardians of the public against violence");as (2) areas where
Congress has sanctioned the retention of jurisdiction by the states;3
(3) conduct beyond the scope or remedies of the N.L.R.A. (out of this
exception developed the "peripheral concern" test).ar When state
antitrust law is applied to a provision of a collective bargaining agree-
ment which may "arguably" be protected as a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining, the rationale of the above exceptions is not met. There is no
physical violence or threat of harm, Congress has not sanctioned state
35. The major violence cases are all pre-Garmon: Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 US.
131 (1957) ("Though the state court was within its discretionary power in enjoining future
acts of violence, intimidation and threats of violence by the strikers and the union, yet it
is equally clear that such court entered the pre-empted domain of the National Labor
Relations Board insofar as it enjoined peaceful picketing by petitioners." Id. at 189);
UAWV v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 US. 266 (1956) ("No one suggests that
such violence is beyond state criminal power. The Act does not have such regulatory
pervasiveness.... The States are the natural guardians of the public against violence."
Id. at 272, 274); Allen Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315
U.S. 740 (1942) (a pre-Taft-Hartley case, thus not involving a situation vwhere the Act
could be argued to have provided remedies for the union's conduct. "If the order of the
state Board ... caused a forfeiture of collective bargaining rights, a distinctly different
question would arise." Id. at 751).
56. Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 95 (1953) (state prohibition of
agency shop clause held enforceable by state courts: "[W]hile Congress could pre-empt as
much or as little of this interstate field as it chose, it would be odd to construe § 14(b)
[29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1964)] as permitting a State to prohibit the agency dause but barring
it from implementing its own law with sanctions of the kind involved here." Id. at 99);
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) ('The authority of the Board to deal
with an unfair labor practice which also violates a collective bargaining contract is not
displaced by § 301 [29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964)], but it is not exclusive and does not destroy
the jurisdiction of the courts in suits under § 301." Id. at 197); De Veau v. Braisted, 363
U.S. 144 (1960) ("[Tlhe States presented their legislative program to cope ith an urgent
local problem [felons holding union offieJ to the Congress, and the Congress unambig.
uously supported what is at the core of this reform." Id. at 153).
37. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) ("[Tjhe unique role played by the duty of fair
representation doctrine in the scheme of federal labor laws, and its important relationship
to the judicial enforcement of collective bargaining agreements in the context presented
here, render the Garmon pre-emption doctrine inapplicable." Id. at 188); Linn v. Plant
Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) ('T]he exercise of state jurisdiction here
would be a 'merely peripheral concern of the Labor-Management Relations Act' . . . ."
Id. at 61. The redress of malicious libel was also classified as "an overriding state interest,"
and the Court recognized the remedial differences involved. Id. at 61, 63); Hanna Mining
Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs, 382 U.S. 181 (1965) (C'IThe Board's decision that Hanna
engineers are supervisors removes from this case most of the opportunities for pre-
emption." Id. at 188); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (19G4) (arbitration
not pre-empted since "the Act does not deal with the controversy anterior to a strike nor
provide any machinery for resolving such a dispute absent a strike." Id. at 263); there
are a number of pre-Garmon cases which exemplify the scope.of-coverage and absence-
of-conflicting-remedy rationales, including IAM v. Gonzales, 856 U.S. 617 (1958) (damage
suit for expulsion from union); Construction Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347
U.S. 656 (1954) (though conduct also an unfair labor practice, state common law action
for damages remains); UAV Local 234 v. Wisconsin Emplo)ynent Relations Bd., 336 U.S.
245 (1949) (state could enjoin intermittent work stoppages "because the Federal Board has
no authority either to investigate, approve or forbid the union conduct in question."
Id. at 254).
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intrusion, and the conduct is not beyond the scope of the N.L.R.A.,
but rather is affirmatively protected if it involves the determination
of wages rather than prices.38
Moreover, the "peripheral concern" cases30 were not focused on the
economic relations of the parties but instead involved questions of
remedy and internal relations within the union itself which were in
fact as well as rhetoric "peripheral." In contrast, if anything is a central
concern of the Act it is the bargaining process and its culmination in
the collective agreement-both of which are threatened by application
of state antitrust law.40 True, the Act itself does not define with any
clarity the limits on the content of collective agreements. But a per-
suasive argument can be made that the line-drawing problem is too
critical to federal labor policy to allow state rather than federal courts
to perform the delicate task. This conclusion seemingly follows by dear
analogy from the words of the Court in Oliver:
If there is to be this sort of limitation on the arrangements that
unions and employers may make with regard to these subjects,
pursuant to the collective bargaining provisions of the Wagner
and Taft-Hartley Acts, it is for Congress, not the States, to pro.
vide it.41
Federal courts in, for example, Pennington and Jewel Tea, have found
such congressional limitations in the Sherman Act. If state courts are
only to apply the same limitations there seems no need for their juris.
diction. If they are to draw different limitations from state law, there
seems no role for their jurisdiction under the philosophy of Garmon.42
38. This would be true unless a Pennington conspiracy were alleged and, as could
happen, Pennington were held to remove state pre-emption as it has removed federal
antitrust exemption.
39. Namely Vaca and Linn. See note 37 supra.
40. Where state law has sought to regulate that which the Court regarded as a central
concern of national labor policy, the state law has been invalidated. In Hill v. Florida,
325 U.S. 538 (1945), a state statute prohibiting the union from functioning as a collective
bargaining agent unless it had previously complied with the law's provisions was voided as
infringing on the "full freedom of employees in collective bargaining." A similar fite
befell a Wisconsin statute which punished interruptive strikes by public utility workers
in Motor Coach Div. 998 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951),
and a Michigan statute which prohibited strikes without prior resort to state mediation
and strike authorization procedures in UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950). just as the
right to bargain collectively and the right to strike are guaranteed by the N.L.RA., so
should the right to reach a collective agreement on mandatory subjects of bargaining be
protected, subject only to limitations engrafted upon it by federal, and not state, law.
41. 358 U.S. at 297.
42. Although this Note has assumed that the only alternative to state jurisdiction fn an
antitrust litigation involving a collective bargaining agreement arguably protected by
the Act but over which the Board has no jurisdiction is the preemption of the state
jurisdiction, the N.L.R.A. could be amended to provide for Board jurisdiction to decide
such abstract questions of law. jewel Tea's denial of such "abstract question" jurisdiction
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This analysis can claim only the same vitality that the Garmon
philosophy enjoys, of course. Garmon arose as a reaction to state court
recalcitrance in applying federal labor policy, and perhaps should be
re-examined as an overreaction. State courts may have outgrown their
hostility to federal labor policy since 1959; perhaps the Supreme Court
overestimated the threat even then. Even if full faith cannot yet be
placed in the state courts, the situation may well have improved
sufficiently to justify a more selective solution to the problem than
Garmon represents. The exceptions grafted upon that doctrine without
overt effort to update its sharp basic thrust suggest that this is so, at
least in the eyes of the Supreme Court. Perhaps state courts can safely
be entrusted with the delicate task of reconciling federal labor policy
With the need to protect consumers from anticompetitive practices.
If so, a reappraisal of Garmon would be more fitting than recourse to
an availability-of-administrative-forum test putatively consistent with
Garmon but at odds with its philosophy.
stemmed from a narrow reading of the mandate given the Board which specifies that it
"'is empowered . . .to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice
(listed in Section 8) affecting commerce," since by necessary implication the Board siould
have the power to prevent interference with bargaining parties who have avoided the
commission of unfair labor practices. The Act was drawn to provide administrative
rbsdlution of unfair labor practice charges so that the institution of collective bargaining
and the sanctity of the collective agreement could be preserved. In order to perform
its function properly the Board should be gven jurisdiction to resolve questions as to
whether or not a specific contractual provision involves a subject about which the parties
are commanded to bargain by the Act. 5 U.S.C. § 1004(d) (1954) (Section 5(a) of tie
Administrative Procedure Act), provides that:
The agency is authorized in its sound discretion, with like effect as in the case of
other orders to issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove
uncertainty.
This provision appears ideal for use as suggested, and yet the Court in Jewel Tea appeared
to reject it. To correct this, Congress could specifically provide for such "abstract question"
jurisdiction either limited to actions under state antitrust law or including those arising
under the Sherman Act.
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